Appendix
1. All books
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats
Biotechnology for Beginners: An overview of biotechnology for beginners and lay readers. Includes a wide array of biotech sciences such as: genetics, immunology, biochemistry, agronomy, food science, and animal science.
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution
Biosecurity Dilemmas: Dreaded Diseases, Ethical Responses, and the Health of Nations, Christian Eanemark, 2017. (Somewhat philosophical, organized around core tensions/dilemmas in biosecurity and thus recommended by several as a good reference.)
Biological Threats in the 21st Century: The Politics, People, Science and Historical Roots, Ed. Filippa Lentzos, 2016. (Collection of essays by subject matter experts; expensive but recommended as a good and diverse reference.)
Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 2014. (Recommended and reviewed here; book-length sceptical take on non-state bioweapons development.)
Bioterror and Biowarfare: A Beginner's Guide, Malcolm Dando, 2006. (See Notes on “Bioterror and Biowarfare” on the EA forum.)
Global Catastrophic Risks, Ed. Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, 2007. (GBCRs appear in chapters 14 and 20.)
Synthetic Biology: Safety, Security, and Promise, Gigi Gronvall, 2016.
The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, David Hoffman, 2009. (Recommended by several people for understanding more about the US bioweapons program.)
Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs, Michael Osterholm and Mark Olshaker, 2020. (Likely worth getting the May 2020 paperback edition, which has a preface on COVID-19.)
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History, Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, 2021.
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, Daniel Ellsberg, 2017. (Not directly about biological risks, but an engaging read that gave me more sense of how the US military operates in the face of catastrophic risks.)
Other books on My list that have not been reviewed:
"The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History" by John M. Barry: This book provides insight into the 1918 flu pandemic and offers lessons on how to prevent and manage future pandemics.
"Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic" by David Quammen: The book details how pandemics often originate from diseases that spill over from animals to humans and what can be done to prevent them.
"The End of Epidemics: The Looming Threat to Humanity and How to Stop It" by Dr. Jonathan D. Quick and Bronwyn Fryer: The authors provide strategies for how to prevent epidemics and pandemics.
"Pandemic: Tracking Contagions, from Cholera to Ebola and Beyond" by Sonia Shah: This book explores the history of pandemics and discusses measures for preventing future outbreaks.
"The Rules of Contagion: Why Things Spread - and Why They Stop" by Adam Kucharski
"Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs" by Michael T. Osterholm and Mark Olshaker
"Pale Rider: The Spanish Flu of 1918 and How It Changed the World" by Laura Spinney
"The Pandemic Century: One Hundred Years of Panic, Hysteria, and Hubris" by Mark Honigsbaum
2. All podcasts
Biosecurity as an EA cause area | Claire Zabel | EA Global: San Francisco 2017
Biotechnology and existential risk | Andrew Snyder Beattie | EA Global: London 2017
Hear This Idea: Jassi Pannu and Joshua Monrad on Pandemic Preparedness
Hear This Idea: Tessa Alexanian and Janvi Ahuja on Synthethic Biology and GCBRs
Hear this idea: Kevin Esvelt and Jonas Sandbrink on Risks from Biological Research
#4 – Howie Lempel on why we aren't worried enough about the next pandemic — and specifically what we can do to stop it.
#65 – Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins on 8 years of combating WMD terrorism
#70 – Dr Cassidy Nelson on the twelve best ways to stop the next pandemic (and limit COVID-19)
#74 – Dr Greg Lewis on COVID-19 and reducing global catastrophic biological risks
#104 – Dr Pardis Sabeti on the Sentinel system for detecting and stopping pandemics
#93 – Andy Weber on rendering bioweapons obsolete and ending the new nuclear arms race
#103 – Max Roser on building the world's first great source of COVID-19 data at Our World in Data
#114 – Maha Rehman on working with governments to rapidly deliver masks to millions of people
#116 – Luisa Rodriguez on why global catastrophes seem unlikely to kill us all
#131 – Lewis Dartnell on getting humanity to bounce back faster in a post-apocalyptic world
Making Sense: Existential Risk - A Conversation with Toby Ord
Making Sense: Special Episode: Engineering the Apocalypse - Rob Reid
Making Sense: What Have We Learned from the Pandemic? - A Conversation with Nicholas Christakis
Making Sense: EPISODE 323 Science & Survival A Conversation with Martin Rees
Preparing for a World in which Thousands Can Unleash New Pandemics | Kevin Esvelt | EAGxBoston 22
Rationally Speaking Podcast: 137: Should scientists try to create dangerous viruses? (Marc Lipsitch)
Rationally Speaking Podcast: 261: Dangerous biological research – is it worth it? (Kevin Esvelt)
Rationally Speaking Podcast: 262: Humanity on the precipice (Toby Ord)
Founders Pledge: Episode 2 COVID-19 briefing with the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
The Portal 27: Daniel Schmachtenberger - On Avoiding Apocalypses
FLI Podcast (Part 1): From DNA to Banning Biological Weapons With Matthew Meselson and Max Tegmark
Michael Mina COVID rapid tests - Lex Fridman (Video/Podcast, 2 hours 14 mins)
Preventing the next pandemic - Kevin Esvelt (video, 70 mins)
Reducing global catastrophic biological risks | Jaime Yassif | EA Student Summit 2020
Pandemic pathogens | Amesh Adalja | EA Global: San Francisco 2018
Assessing global catastrophic biological risks | Crystal Watson | EA Global: San Francisco 2018
Marc Lipsitch: Preventing catastrophic risks by mitigating subcatastrophic ones
The next outbreak? We’re not ready Bill Gates, TED talk, April 2015. (Gates founded CEPI the year after this, so he put his money where his TED talk was.)
[Conversations with Tyler]
Making Sense: EPISODE 191 Early Thoughts on a Pandemic A Conversation with Amesh Adalja
Making Sense: EPISODE 201 A Conversation with Yuval Noah Harari
Making Sense: EPISODE 214 A Conversation with Siddhartha Mukherjee
Making Sense: EPISODE 222 A Pandemic of Incompetence A Conversation with Nicholas Chrisakis
Making Sense: EPISODE 233 In the Groves on Misinformation A Conversation with Zeynep Tufekci
#77 – Marc Lipsitch on whether we're winning or losing against COVID-19
#84 – Shruti Rajagopalan on what India did to stop COVID-19 and how well it worked
FLI Podcast: Lessons from COVID-19 with Emilia Javorsky and Anthony Aguirre
Top epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch on whether we’re winning or losing against COVID-19
Future of Life Award 2020: Saving 200,000,000 Lives by Eradicating Smallpox
FLI Podcast: On the Future of Computation, Synthetic Biology, and Life with George Church
3. Other interesting podcasts in the field
Future of Life Award 2020: Saving 200,000,000 Lives by Eradicating Smallpox
FLI Podcast: On the Future of Computation, Synthetic Biology, and Life with George Church
4. All Companies
Database of companies.
4.1 HVAC Systems
Safetraces: is working on verifying ventilation and filtration performance for the removal of airborne pathogens. They measure, verify and manage HVAC system performance.
RZero: transform your healthy buildings program with IoT connected sensors and UV-C disinfection devices for every indoor space.
Particle one: have a software to monitor and modell the indoor airqulity.
Poppy: working on making indoor spaces infection-resilient and overall more healthy
The Air Doctor: Air Purification and Filtration Systems
Blaschke J Wehrtechnik: working on NBC Protective Suits, Ventilation Systems etc
Beth-El Industries: Filtration, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning Systems
BORSERINI: Industrial Filtration Technology for Military and Defence Applications
Kinetics: NBC / CBRN Systems, and HVAC and Cooling Equipment
CMCA: Air-Conditioning, Power-Generation and Integrated Shelter Solutions for Military Application
Kinetics: Auxiliary Power Units (APU) Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC), NBC/CBRN Systems
Weiss Defence: Air-conditioning System Specifically Designed For Mobility And The Defence Market
Temet: Blast Protection and CBRN Filtration Systems To Protect Military Infrastructure
4.2 Early Detection
Concentric by Ginkgo: provide human testing service
Fluid Robotics: is Revolutionizing How We Monitor Wastewater
Biobot Analytics: water waste sampling
Metabiota: has a mission of making the world more resilient to epidemics through partnering with local stakeholders in LMICs to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks. Their data and analytics technology was acquired by Ginkgo Bioworks, in August 2022, due to its extensive breadth of infectious disease outbreak data that is suited for epidemiological tracking and forecasting. They operate on 3 pillars:
Disease surveillance: plan, support and execute surveillance activities of humans and animals together with local authorities to manage known, and identify new emerging infectious diseases.
Capacity building: drive the development of strong disease surveillance and response capabilities by strengthening infrastructure and workforce to excel at biosafety and biosecurity, diagnostics, response, treatment, and more.
Science: conduct and support local research to understand local disease and epidemic risks.
4.3 Real Time Detection Systems
Seaspec Real Time Pathogen Detection at the Point of Care
Q-linea: Biological Agent Detection and Identification Systems and Technology
4.4 Air Samplers
Develping air sampler for CBRN Defense Forces
4.5 Various Early Detection Systems
Smell detection
Breath sampling
Owlstone Medical is developing a breathalyzer for disease for the early detection of cancer, inflammatory and infectious disease.
Noze Developing a device for screening and diagnostics of infectious diseases from biomarkers
Rosa biotech: biosensor for detecting disease using patient samples
4.6 Biological Weapon Sensors for Military and Civilian Protection
Proengin SA: Chemical and Biological Particle Detectors for Military and Civilian Security
Safety and Rescue Region - Mid Sweden Military Safety Training and Testing Services
4.7 Vaccines
Centivax Developing broad spectrum Vaccines
Pfizer: The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine was one of the first to be authorized for emergency use.
Moderna: The Moderna COVID-19 vaccine was also among the first to receive emergency use authorization.
Johnson & Johnson (Janssen): Their single-dose vaccine was approved for emergency use in 2021.
AstraZeneca/Oxford University: Their vaccine has been widely used globally, especially in low- and middle-income countries.
Novavax: Novavax's protein subunit vaccine was in late-stage trials as of September 2021.
Sanofi/GlaxoSmithKline: This partnership was working on a protein subunit vaccine.
CureVac: A German company focused on mRNA vaccines.
Bharat Biotech: An Indian biotechnology company that developed Covaxin.
Sinovac: A Chinese biopharmaceutical company that developed Coronavac.
Gamaleya Research Institute (Sputnik V): The Russian-developed vaccine.
Sinopharm: This Chinese company has developed two inactivated virus COVID-19 vaccines.
CanSino Biologics: This is another Chinese company that has developed a viral vector COVID-19 vaccine.
BioNTech: This German company collaborated with Pfizer to develop one of the first mRNA COVID-19 vaccines.
Instituto Butantan: A Brazilian biologic research center that has collaborated with Sinovac on the CoronaVac vaccine.
Serum Institute of India: An Indian biotech and pharmaceuticals company that's the world's largest vaccine manufacturer by doses. They've produced versions of the AstraZeneca/Oxford vaccine under the name Covishield.
Zydus Cadila: Another Indian pharmaceutical company that has been involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.
Vector Institute: A Russian research center that has developed a peptide-based COVID-19 vaccine.
Covaxx: A division of United Biomedical, has been developing a peptide-based COVID-19 vaccine.
Medicago: A Canadian biotech company developing a plant-based COVID-19 vaccine.
Baylor College of Medicine: An academic institution involved in vaccine research and development.
University of Queensland/CSL: An Australian collaboration that initially worked on a COVID-19 vaccine.
Clover Biopharmaceuticals: A Chinese biotech company developing a protein subunit COVID-19 vaccine.
ImmunityBio: A U.S.-based company working on a viral vector COVID-19 vaccine.
Inovio Pharmaceuticals: A U.S. company developing a DNA-based COVID-19 vaccine.
4.8 PPE
Micronel: Air Purification Masks, Inline and Two-Filter Blowers and Air Flow Monitoring Equipment
Antimicrobial clothing for medical staff: Prevent & Deloza: Bespoke Uniforms and Protective Clothing for Military Personnel
4.9 UVC Lamps
Lumenlabs Far-UVC
Bankrupt Healthe owes its UV-C supplier and its billionaire owner
UltraViolet various UV products
4.10 Medicine
Resiliance: Biomanufacturing innocation partner, revoltionisin how novel medicines are made, funded and scaled.
4.11 Water Purification
Eimco Water Technologies: Deployable Wastewater Treatment for Field Operations and Construction Camps
Global Water: Water Purification, Desalination, Wastewater and Wastewater-Effluent Recycling
Kaercher Futuretech: Field Camp Systems, Water Supply Systems, Mobile Catering Systems and CBRN Protection Systems
Pure H2O: Water Filtration Systems for Harsh Environments
TerraGroup: Tactical Water Purification Systems for Military Field Applications
Water Generating Systems: Water Sustainability Solutions for Military and Mobile Unite
4.12 CBRN Defence
Hotzone Solutions: NBC Training, Consultancy and Equipment Testing Services
Lunor: NBC Protection for Shelters and Hardened Buildings
BoxModul: Ballistic and Blast Protective Safe Shelters
em.tronic: Stand alone detection system and deployable lab
Armoured Vehicles and Stand-Alone Protection
Gamma: CBRN Defence Equipment for the Military Industry (Our company offers complex CBRN building monitoring systems, as well as on-board detection systems for infantry vehicles, special-purpose reconnaissance vehicles and mobile laboratories.)
NBC-Sys: CBRN Protection Systems for Defense Forces and Population
Observis: Monitoring and Control Solutions for the Defence Industry
Critical infrastructure solutions
It integrates detectors, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems and automatic doors into a full automation security system controlled in one highly visual user interface. The device and system independence of ObSAS offers complete freedom to choose the best and most suitable equipment to fulfil the installation’s security design and specifications, from office facility to underground shelter.OWR: NBC Protection, NBC Detection and Decontamination System
4.13 Decontamination
Hispano Vema: NBC / CBRN Decontamination and Protection Systems and Mobile Field Camps
Cristanini: CBRN Decontamination Equipment
4.14 Others
National Institute for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection: Testing and Training for the CBRN Environment
Gamma: CBRN Defence Equipment for the Military Industry
Camp Supply International: Container-Based Camp Shelter, Kitchen and Toilet Modules
Pimco: Specialist Equipment for Detecting Weapons of Mass Destruction
5. Discussion Promt question (from BlueDot Impact)
5.1 Defining the GCBR Landscape
“What do you think is the probability of extinction from bio? Compare different methodologies and numbers, noting that the Precipice’s probability (3.3%) and that quoted in the 80K article (2%)
How do GCBRs compare to other potential existential risk, such as unaligned AI and nuclear war?
How do GCBRs relate to other potential X-risks? Which responses would be specific GCBF and which ones could also have positive impact on preventing other X-risks
Could pandemics serve as tipping points, start a domino effect to make other X-risks more likely even though pandemics themselves might not be a X-risk? What could such domino effects be? (e.g. pandemics increase societal inequalities -> social unrest -> governmental instability -> increase in probability of nuclear war?)
How likely is civilisational collapse with different percentages of the global population dying, and how likely this is to lead to eventual extinction, or totalitarian or other lock-in?
What other factors might influence whether e.g. a GCBR event leading to ~90% population reduction would actually lead to extinction?
Do you agree that the risks from engineered pandemics are greater than the risks from natural pandemics?
How do you think Covid-19 has affected the risk of a global catastrophic biorisk (GCBRs)?
How are we more/less vulnerable to biorisks now than we were previously?
Discuss the "recovery is robust and reliable” view --> how much do you believe in it? What are your key questions/uncertainties 'about this? What bottlenecks could we fix in order to make civilisation more robust and reliable?
Discuss what percentage of resources available to biosecurity interventions participants would allocate to prevention (e.g. policy) vs. response (e.g. technical solutions like vaccines, early detection) vs. "last resort" solutions (e.g. bunkers, seed banks, etc)?
Ask the participants to define the concept of “actor sophistication”
How can we keep entry barriers high or what measures could we undertake to prevent actor sophistication?
Consider a matrix of pandemics “deliberate vs. accidental - natural vs. engineered” (below). What kind of pandemics would you put in each sector and which sector seems most concerning?
5.2 Biosafety and Dual Use Research Concerns
Definitions/Understanding
Ask participants to define the term “dual-use research of concern” to test their own understanding + to discuss the different definitions for this term in the glossary
Ask participants to describe what the unilateralists curse is and why the “asymmetry” around it is particularly problematic.
Scientific practice and ethics
Is open science “dogma” in the scientific community? How can we create better biosecurity norms in the scientific community?
What mechanisms in the conventional academic scientific process can be used so that dual-use is considered (eg: ethics, funding, regulation, peer review)? What are the pros/cons of each?
What are the pros and cons of private life science funding?
What do you think about the idea of introducing regulations around what types of research journals are and aren’t allowed to publish? How could it work, would it be beneficial at all? How else could we incentivise journals to take on responsible publishing practices related to infohazards and DURC?
What downsides could strongly restricting access to e.g. papers on DURC have?
Marc Lipsitch has commented (I think in the video in the optional reading but not sure!) that most researchers either think that GOF research is low risk and highly useful OR that it is high risk and not very useful. Why do few think it is high risk and highly useful or the opposite? Should we be suspicious of the arguments here (eg: motivated reasoning)?
Gain of function research like creating a between-human transmissible H5 influenza virus is very controversial. Some people think these viruses shouldn’t be created under any circumstances while others argue that the possibility of a natural H5 pandemic arising is like a natural time bomb? Where on this “spectrum” would you put yourself and why?
How much of a risk do DIY biologists like biohackers pose in terms of GCBRs? Is regulation (or other interventions) possible in the age of biohackers?
5.3 The BWC
If the BWC got 10x as much budget, what should it do with that money? What could an effective verification mechanism look like? Would having an imperfect verification mechanism be a good first step or not create the necessary transparency to stop arms race?
BWC vs CWC or the IAEE/NPT
BWC has no verification mechanism and loads less funding relative to the other bodies
Confidence building measures (CBMs)
Security dilemmas
How could the BWC actually track if people in a lab are doing dangerous research?
5.4 Biosafety Levels
Are there differences in how BSL levels work in other countries?
How are these different in different countries? How are they regulated globally? How are they maintained?
Has anyone worked in a BSL-3 or 4 lab? What was the experience like?
Is a culture change needed in science with regards to how seriously biosafety is taken?
5.5 Advances in biotechnology and a note on Information Hazards
Discussion Prompts
Definitions and understanding
What's the role of CRISPR for modern synthetic biology? Describe its dual-use potential.
What was the human genome project? How did it impact biosciences?
The term "risk landscape" was mentioned several times in the readings. How do you understand this term in the context of biorisk?
What does the term "export control" refer to? How relevant do you think export control measures are in mitigating GCBR?
Advances and current capabilities in Biotechnology
Do you think that the quick rise of this field can tell us something about the future trajectory? Can we expect advances at the same pace as in the last 20 years?
Which technologies did you find most interesting in the Horizon Scan? Which timelines are unexpected to you? Was there a particular technology that to you seemed to have particularly high-dual use potential when developed in the future?
After having read about many of the advancements in synthetic biology: Do you think synthetic biology should be made more accessible, or should access be more regulated and restricted to a smaller group of people?
Should technologies which have the potential to spread in an unbounded fashion (e.g. gene drives) be subject to more stringent regulation? Consider this vs pathogens (human, animal, plant pathogens etc.) which can also spread and cause disease or ecological disruption. Are they fundamentally different?
Accidental release vs. deliberate weaponization of biotechnologies. Which one seems more concerning to you at the moment?
Discuss pros and cons of philanthropy shaping the biological research agenda!
Looking at some of the iGEM projects: do you feel you over or underestimated the capabilities of undergraduate student groups?
Information hazards
What do you understand under " misuse of genetic information" ?
"Biological information is more dangerous than biological material" Do you agree? Comment on this statement.
What’s your take on censoring science? Do you think censorship could plausibly drive biological research underground?
Having read about the three case studies (Mousepox, H5 influenza, Botulinum toxin), what would you do differently if you were in the shoes of the scientists who conducted these experiments?
At what stage/s is it best to assess the biosecurity concerns related to research, and how best should we ‘censor’ dangerous information? (point towards funding only relevant stuff)
Why is a "classification" of bad actors into sophisticated/non-sophisticated relevant? How is biorisk distributed across the spectrum of these actors?
What guidance or principles should be used for determining if it is better to release or withhold information?
Is the Effective Altruism movement overly cautious regarding discussing information hazards?
Should we teach more synthetic biologists principles of biosecurity or is this too risky regarding the info hazards around this field?
5.6 Bioweapons and Biodefense
What are the incentives to develop bioweapons for states? What are the incentives for cults? Lone wolves?
How can we mitigate different actors having these incentives?
Are the bottlenecks in mitigating bioweapon development/deployment related to technology (e.g. surveillence/screening methods not being good enough), or are they related to a lack of political will for implementation?
It seems hard to target bioweapons on specific people. What are the implications of this?
How succesfull does a mitigation method have to be to be impactful? Is it better to raise the barrier slightly on many fronts or should we be searching for a method that completely nips developing bioweapons in the bud?
Who poses the biggest threat to develop bioweapons of mass destruction?
States, individual biohackers (e.g. misanthropists), middle sized groups (e.g. cults, terrorist groups)?
Why are bad actors bad actors? What do focus on to mitigate: causes why cults, individuals want to target people (e.g. education, mental health) or rather on preventing "already bad actors" from doing harm?
Does it make sense for states to develop biological weapons? What are incentives? How about rational vs. irrational incentives/motivations?
Does biggest risk come from irrational actors with access to resources (dictators, terrorists)?
Can we provide incentives to prevent them from developing bioweapons? Treaties? Conventions?
How would managed access increase transparency? If states/actors are allowed to hide all kinds of information/access and only share the things that looks good for them wouldn't that be dangerous because they might be developing bioweapons in secret while being perceived as adhering to the convention?
What does a good verification system look like?
Why do Chemical Weapons Convention and Nuclear Weapons Convention seem to be more successful in gaining trust/ratification, having verification/enforcing mechanisms and having more funding?
What are some of the factors that made the Chemical Weapons Convention more successful? Can these be applied to the BWC?
What did you find most interesting about the history of bioweapons - what lessons can we draw for the future of bioweapons use and prevention?
Discuss some of the difficulties we face regulating bioweapons compared to nuclear weapons.
Why do you think the BWC lacks funding?
What scenarios do you think seem most plausible (and most concerning) for the development and use of biological weapons?
What was your favourite fun (or scary) fact about the history of biological weapons?
How did bioweapons developed in the past compare to those that we’re concerned about now?
Are biological weapons a thing of the past?
Why do you think modern bioterrorists have been largely unsuccessful? Do you think this is likely to change, if so why?
How tractable does the implementation of a verification or transparency protocol for the BWC seem to you? How effective would it plausibly be?
If the BWC had 10x its current funding, what do you think it should do?
How much risk comes from single bioterrorists vs. terrorist groups vs. states developing bioweapons programs? Should we be more scared of people with little capability but strong intent to cause a lot of harm rather than states having a lot of resources but not the intention of killing everyone on the planet?
What’s your take on the managed access system for inspections? Would it create true transparency or only the appearance of transparency?
What are the main incentives for countries to initiate bioweapons programs? What incentives could countries have to stop bioweapons programs (looking at historical examples)
Compare the regulation of chemical, nuclear and bioweapons. What are the main challenges with the regulation of bioweapons compared to the other two.
5.7 Pandemic prevention and diagnostics
Pandemic response
Should transmissible vaccines be used as a last resort?
Do receptor decoys seem like a promising response? Why haven’t they been researched before?
Do you agree with Kevin Esvelt’s main uncertainty regarding the number of bad actors?
What do you think is the biggest benefit of genetic attribution?
How useful is genetic attribution for non-state actors?
Discuss information hazards/dual use scenarios mentioned in the Esvelt video
How important/promising do you think digital epidemiology is in detecting pandemics early? How well would it work for different kinds of pathogens (asymptomatic for a long time vs. symptomatic quickly, very lethal vs. very transmissible)
How do you weigh data privacy concerns against the different options to leverage data from patients, social media users etc. to detect pathogens early? How could public engagement look like to build trust in the population in using such data-collection and -interpretation systems? What properties would these systems need to have (anonymisation at what level? Encryption at what level etc.)?
What technologies or policies are you most excited about for preventing future pandemics and/or GCBRs?
What should we do once we detect a novel virus growing exponentially?
What are the bottlenecks in developing a global early warning system for pathogen detection?
5.8 Policy interventions
What might be some challenges of creating a new joint assessment mechanism (JAM) to rapidly investigate biological events of unknown origin?
What are some examples of confidence building measures that could be used to build trust and reduce uncertainty between different nations?
How tractable do you think it is to have universal DNA synthesis screening such screening is commonplace for all DNA synthesis machines and organisations/countries?
How is the (UK/US) government structured? How might this inform what policies we try to implement and how?
For strengthening global biosecurity, which governments might we try to prioritise policy change in?
How likely do you think it is that governments will “fight the last war” and are not generalising the lessons learnt from COVID-19 enough? What might be different in a GCBR scenario? What might be the same?
What can we learn from different countries’ responses to COVID-19 and other previous pandemics, are there any models/plans that stand out that could be best adapted?
Discuss the pros and cons of prizes such as the proposed metagenomics prize! What type or people/research orgs would be most interested in participating? What are some possible downsides of prizes compared to just funding specific groups to carry out specific research projects?
Do you think we could speed up biosecurity governance without speeding general legislation processes?
Both the CLTR’s future proof report and NTI’s report suggest founding new biosecurity organisations. Is this a good fix for some of the key problems in biosecurity or would it actually create coordination problems? What could be potential downsides of setting up new biosecurity organisations from scratch?
Which seems more tractable: building new institutions or reforming existing ones?
What expertise would it be important for the National Centre for Biosecurity to contain?
What kind of structure would this organisation need to have? Is it worthwhile to bring different skill sets together?
Why do you think the CLTR focused on the areas they did? Are there other areas you would have suggested or areas they should have skipped?
How would you prioritise the interventions proposed across the reports?
What is the best incentive structure to encourage policy innovation? Grants? Prizes? Something different?
What regulations that were set up or developed for the response to covid could be useful for future (and potentially more severe) pandemics? What types of regulations do we completely lack e.g. mandating essential workers to go to work
With regards to investigating the origin of an outbreak (lab leak, bioterrorism, bioweapons developed by states actors etc.) the Joint Assessment Mechanism wants the process to be rapid. How could knowledge about the origin of a pathogen help with and guide response?
*Sneaky hackathon idea* The world is struck with a pandemic (airborne? Surface transmission?) with a fatality rate of x% (let’s say 60%). You have a limited budget as society breaks down. How do you apply what you have learned in this course to structure society in the optimal way to recover from this catastrophic scenario? How do you treat people, minimise transmission, and ensure essential services continue? We could run this as a tabletop exercise, maybe for a day, or for a short session, as an open ended problem to solve. As you do it, note down key uncertainties, and where you think society currently lacks the capabilities to respond appropriately. We are actually going to do this.”
6. Did not make it to the list
“Many of the catastrophic risks about which effective altruists concern themselves are likely to result from the failure to control much smaller events, which then grow so large that they do become catastrophic. In this EA Global: Boston 2017 talk, Marc Lipsitch describes examples from infectious diseases — a paradigm case of a growing risk — and implications for the allocation of our attention, effort and funds.”
#93 – Andy Weber on rendering bioweapons obsolete and ending the new nuclear arms race
“Things discussed:
The chances that COVID-19 escaped from a research facility
Whether a US president can really truly launch nuclear weapons unilaterally
What he thinks should be the top priorities for the Biden administration
If Andy was 18 and starting his career over again today, what would his plan be?
The time he and colleagues found 600kg of unsecured, highly enriched uranium sitting around in a barely secured facility in Kazakhstan, and eventually transported it to the United States
And much more.”
Gene Drives: Pursuing Opportunities, Minimizing Risk, Kelsey Lane Warmbrod et al., Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, May 2020.
Updated Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment, Volume I. Second part: Updated Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment, Volume II. (Biosafety for factory farms)